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Abstract 
In the history of modern knowledge one could notice the analogies that exist between the paths and the resolutions of any major 
forms of non-dogmatic enquiry which attempted to provide a comprehensive explanation and understanding of the Human Being 
and the Universe. The investigation in the Natural Sciences established the cornerstone of objectivity as its guiding principle. 
From the beginning, it has looked downward for the most solid foundation in objects and ended up finding the human 
consciousness reflected by the very core of quantum reality, the (self-)reflexivity of  human consciousness in quantum reality. In 
the Social and Psychological Sciences, the (self-)reflexivity of a particular knowledge (theory/matter) over the knowledge that 
produced it (discipline itself/researcher) forms the main epistemological and methodological debate over the meaning and the 
condition of possibility for the scientific objectivity in the field.  Modern Philosophy started with the methodical doubt from the 
Cartesian Meditations, advanced through a transcendental perspective and ended in the pure self-reflexivity of the 
phenomenological consciousness. Even if the unavoidable conclusion is that Self-reflexivity has proved to be the closing stage of 
any mature reflective mode of knowledge – whether it was natural, social or psychological science, philosophical or literary – the 
key question is ‘Why?’ 
© 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. 
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1. Introduction 
In the modern, world scientific knowledge has replaced the philosophical, religious or traditional knowledge as 
primacy, explanatory power and influence. Nowadays, regardless its religious believes, family inheritance, cultural 
particularities ones takes his economic, politic, and administrative, technical decisions mostly on the basis of 
scientifically acquired and validated information. As the foundation of scientific inquiry is the empirical validation 
of theoretical assumption, the Theory, in its broader sense, comes to shape our understanding. “Theories structure 
our world. “Theories are our world. Theory is not just something practiced in the academy by a collection of 
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«specialists». We see our theories everywhere. We are our theories.” (Gamez, 2007, p. 1) But often at the base of 
these scientific theories lies some dogmatic, mythological presuppositions. People endow theories with trust and 
confidence, but foundations of theories are not always as scientific as it seems. The theory of theory has no 
foundation. And this is where the self-reflexivity issue comes to the fore.   
The reflexivity is a one of the most conceptualized term in the philosophy of social sciences, and yet one of the 
less used in daily academic writings and practice. Its meaning covers the entire area from reflection, self-reference, 
to self-reflectiveness and is often conflated with self-reflexivity. In their turn these terms are intimately related to 
being conscious, consciousness, self-consciousness, reflexive self-consciousness. Its complexity results from its 
different interdisciplinary meanings. As a quality, in logical (mathematical) sense, the term reflexive implies a 
relation that always holds between a term and itself. In linguistic sense, the reflexive denotes the quality of referring 
back to the subject of the clause in which it is used. As a method or theory characteristic in social sciences, 
reflexivity implies “taking account of itself or of the effect of the personality or presence of the researcher on what is 
being investigated.” (Hobson, 2004, p. 364). The reflexive means the object reflects the qualities of the subject or 
the subject is reflected in or by the object. In logical sense, the reflexivity refers to a relation in which each term 
points to the other, while in self-reflexivity the object and subject become one. In linguistic sense, self-reflexivity 
emphasizes on self-referential and self-endowing potential, while in methodological sense it evokes the awareness 
of the observer-expectancy effect (also called the experimenter-expectancy effect, expectancy bias, observer effect, 
or experimenter effect). In philosophy, self-reflexivity represents the ontological foundation of all existence as it is 
within the Hegelian philosophy of absolute idealism, in which the rationality reflects the open-ended historical 
process of self-development of reality itself. 
Within the philosophy of science (self-)reflexivity present multifaceted as swell. It is considered as an attribute of 
the theory, a characteristic of its author(s), a quality of the process of research, or a feature of the subjects of 
research. 
In the context of epistemological perspective, self-reflective concern the relation of theory with its author. It is an 
activity of finding or abstracting something about itself (about feelings, thoughts, and actions) but without producing 
them. As a process, reflexivity implies activity where by the act self-consciousness is determined or posited. Self-
Reflexivity is a superior form of self-activity in which the self-consciousness is produced, and it is sustained any 
form of self-consciousness. Self-reflection, self-reference, and self-reflectiveness are prerequisites for the individual 
self-consciousness of the author which finds him/herself within its own theory, s(he) finds him/herself thought by 
him/herself (up to the phenomenological level of thought thinking itself as a thinking). 
As a characteristic of the author, reflexivity is conceived as an attribute of the personal relation with what is 
under scrutiny. The researcher should interact and react while he/she observes and reflects on his/her object. He/she 
studies following some pre-tested working hypothesis, theoretical constructs, hunches and stereotypes. His/her 
understanding was built on and carries with him/her cultural inheritance with all its positives and negatives. 
Reflexivity is “a self-awareness and an awareness of the relationship between the investigator and the research 
environment.” (Lamb & Huttlinger, 1989, p. 766) In relation to the researcher, (self-)reflexivity denotes both self-
reflection and introspection: the fact that the author, when he/she think or study, is aware about he/she existence and 
influence on the object, about its own subjectivity.  
However, reflexivity is not limited to the analytic attention upon the researcher’s role and influence in research 
(Gouldner, 1971), but it also covers the turning back upon his/her socially constructed experience (in research). In 
qualitative research, both the research process and the researcher’s position are open to an on-going process of self-
critique and self-appraisal (Koch & Harrington, 1998, pp. 882-890). 
As a process self-reflection is to reflect upon the act of knowledge, while reflexive is a stance, it is the ability to 
evaluate the influence of oneself within the very act of knowing (research). Although they are not mutually 
exclusive, the reflexivity stance is more complex and could support the reflective process (Fook, 1999). If the 
researcher is not self-reflective he/she is will do the research without knowing what he want to discover or 
understand.  In other words, one can be reflective without being reflexive. That is, one can become self-conscious 
without being conscious of that self-consciousness (Babcock, 1977). 
In social and human sciences the reflexivity is also related with the object. The analyzed subjects react to the 
presence of the researcher who becomes part of their world and they behave accordingly. But the research situation 
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si self-reflexive because it involves reflective re-actions of the researcher to his/her own influence on the studied 
object behavior, and also the very existence of the knower reflected in the known.  
Lastly, the reflexivity is seen as a process and stance, an activity and its result altogether. Reflexivity is an 
interactive spiral-like, and not a linear process, (probably) an open-ended one. Superior form of the knowledge 
relationships between subject and object, (self-)reflexivity is the most concrete expression of the effects of 
information on matter. 
2. Individual versus collective reflexivity 
Another reason for which the meaning of reflexivity is such a slippery concept is its multiple dialectical 
oscillations between: its individual consciousness aspect and collective instantiate knowledge aspect, reality of the 
author and the theory produced by he/she, and the theory which describes reality and the reality which is described 
the theory. Its dialectical aspect, generally speaking, is the result of the dynamic relation of the full circle of reality 
and consciousness, of the hermeneutical circle of the person producing a theory about reality which embraces the 
person as well. In this context appears the accusation of inconsistency of any such theory because of the inconsistent 
self-reference of relation person – theory. Most of the theories about world are self-reflexive inconsistent, i.e. a 
theory wide-ranging enough for applying to its author ultimately cancel itself or fail to explain how they could be 
made possible by their author (its own condition of possibility) (Gamez, 2007). This very intriguing and challenging 
claim is valid only in part, and fails precisely itself is not self-reflexive. Is flaw consists in its logical-formal 
exclusivism. In this perspective, the self-reflexivity of a general knowledge (theory) is easily reduced and conflated 
with the self-referential inconsistency. Any sufficiently wide-ranging theory which embraces the self-reference 
could be considered of self-reflexive and, hence self-collapsing. The circular self-reflexivity status would undermine 
the very possibility of theory. The reason for this is the fact that theory about theory is not made from incriminated 
self-reflexive perspective, but from the logical reasoning of formal discourse. It doesn’t exceed the level of linguistic 
discourse and logical sentences. It neglect that the reference is a state of consciousness. The theories are only the 
frozen expression of what is thought. This is why the most theories are considered to be being self-reflexively 
inconsistent, as they cannot explain how they could be developed by people from within the world set up by that 
theory. Situation is similar with Gödel incompleteness theorem which express that such a theory (system) cannot 
demonstrate its own consistency. The possibility of proving self-consistency within the system and completeness of 
any effective theory from certain expressiveness is lost.  
This is happening because author and theory are seen as completely distinct not in process, but rather static. Or 
the self-reference of a theory could imply self-reflexivity which produces transformations.  If the relation between 
the individual and theory is reflexive, the individual who has envisaged the theory integrates its concepts, is changed 
by it, and self-reflexively transforms him/herself altogether with the meaning assigned by the theory. The theory, on 
its turn is change accordingly with the individual manner in which it was thought.  
In a three-world ontology of reality – physical objects and states, states of consciousness, and knowledge in 
objective sense (Popper, 1978), the dialectic become trialectic and entire hermeneutical circle should be rethought 
and rewritten. Apparently insoluble and collapsing theory proves to be perfectly possible and consistent. The 
scientific knowledge is dialectical which means evolutive is not static, but it has to be constructed by the very act of 
its ongoing process.  
The same misunderstanding would manifests if self-reflexivity and self-referentiality are conflated at individual 
level.  “Reflexive self-knowledge is not merely a person’s knowing that the semantics of reflexive self-reference 
holds of some (thought or sentence) token. We need to add the very phenomenon to be understood: his knowing that 
he himself produced the token.” (Nozick, 1981, p. 80-81) The consciousness of myself, the self-consciousness could 
not be explain only in terms of self-reference (linguistic, semantic, or information), but implies self-reflexivity. No I 
statement is derivable only from non-reflexively self-referring statements, and reflexive self-referring statement 
could not be derived only from non-reflexively self-referring statements. (Nozick, 1981, p. 80-81)  Self-reflexivity 
articulates the concept of the subject itself, and the subject’s concept of an object, at limit this object could be itself. 
This synthesis, coordination is the transcendental ego who gives unity and makes possible all experience of 
consciousness as self-awareness. The transcendental ego is a pole of identity that persists throughout the flux of 
207 Bogdan Popoveniuc /  Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences  163 ( 2014 )  204 – 213 
consciousness, it is constitute as personal self. It is not stark identity on cogito side, but the one which confers the 
principle of unity for the stream of consciousness acts. It should perceived in its fully concreteness (Konkretion), 
because it comprise a correlates in objects, too, as long as they were known and contribute on ego’s concretization. 
Concrete Ego is the cohesion of the flux of consciousness united with the known world. (Lübcke, 2003, p. 81)  
The transcendental apperception, the apperception Husserl is intuitions not logical sentences. Descartes himself 
regarded it as a form of proposition, an intuition, not an enthymeme. The cogito “is an experiment. When that 
experiment is conducted the mind intuits - learns through an insight - the truth that the cogito expresses.” (Sarkar, 
2003, p. x) They are cognitive as much as ontological; they are constitutive to the dual reality consciousness-matter 
of universe. Here we touch a sensible issue in the theory of artificial intelligence, if an if the original apperception of 
an artificial being would be similar with humans. The human beings and their consciousness evolved cogeneric with 
the World, the artificial intelligence was made by man, and this implies an ontological leap.  
Considering such big enquiries and complexity related with this concept is not a surprise if I claim that self-
reflexivity can be seen as the righteousness or wrongness of contemporary epistemology. I argue this because we 
can find it already inserted in the theoretical and practical fields of every mature science.  
3. The Reflexive Nature 
The evolution of Physics in the XXth century was both spectacular and strange for a Science recognized as the 
source, ground and model for all sciences. The advancement of the Archetypal science of physical world underwent 
an obvious shift from the positivist perspective (the objectivity from outside) to the compelling evidence of a located 
and relativistic outlook for any knowledge. Self-contained and “incommensurable” with one another (Lamb & 
Huttlinger, 1989), the swift between Newtonian and Einsteinian theory reveals this great revolution towards 
reflexivity which occurs in the culture of mankind. Following its primary method of facts’ classification, seeing their 
mutual relations and describing their sequences (Pearson, 1892/ 2007, p. 12), the epistemology of modern physics 
has gradually moved from the image of a physical world as a material reflection in understanding toward a theory of 
perceptual reflexivity of the physical world. The consciousness has steadily inserted within the epistemology of 
Physics, at the subatomic scale, it appears unavoidable within the effect of the observer in the “wave function 
collapse” phenomenon. The meaning of observer is not as it is in common language as implying any kind of 
subjective feature in theoretical description: the observer has just “a function of registering decisions, i.e., processes 
in space and time”, the reflexivity of theory is enacted in the interpretation of quantum theory system requires this 
“registration” for the transition from “potential” to “actual” (Heisenberg, 1958/1999, p. 137) 
The epistemology of physics acknowledges the existence of consciousness as part of scientific experience – as 
one of the fundamental conditions of existence for physical phenomena. This is an unbelievable situation for 
Newtonian physics and common sense.  The big quandaries of theoretizing in modern physics has gravitated around 
the problem of observer consciousness. The perception could be subjective, but reality should be objective. But the 
scientific notion of quantum experience has nothing to do with standard understanding of experience both in 
Newtonian physics and everyday life.  
The universal reflexive character of knowledge became obvious and conceptualized in the history of physical 
science, for the first time in 1928, with Niels Bohr’s proposal of the Principle of complementarity. The problems of 
measurability at quantum level force into acceptance the consciousness as the necessary evil for a coherent and 
consistent objective explanation. As it will become obvious further on, this seems to be only the first step in the 
maturation of a new scientific paradigm. It is no wonder the natural science level was the last and the least affected 
by these transformations so far. The primitive stance of understanding is a natural one of opposing the object(ive)-
nature to the subject(iv)-agent. On an imaginary scale of objectivity of such a “natural culture”, the natural sciences 
come first, followed by life, social and humanistic disciplines.  
The next level of understanding for natural sciences should mean their understanding from the point of view of 
the social sciences. In addition to simply accepting the consciousness as a fundamental part of the theory, the theory 
should be self-reflexive. Natural sciences could not be models for social sciences because they leave outside from 
their field of enquiry the social and epistemological context in which the scientific knowledge is possible (Harding, 
1991). On the other hand, their objectivity would be strengthened if they include such analysis of their context of 
knowledge-production. The theory of quantum physics incorporates already the reflexivity as one of its 
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fundamentals. The self-reflexivity arises at this point in recognizing that the understanding of the human mind is 
essential in our formulation of scientific theories, i.e. quantum physic. “The crucial feature of atomic physics is that 
the human observer is not only necessary to observe the properties of an object, but is necessary even to define these 
properties.” (Capra, 1970, p. 144) In sum, the path toward a consistent and mature explanation of the physical world 
passes through an accurate conception about consciousness. The dynamic reality of consciousness should replace 
the naïve model of passive analyzer/observer, so that the physics will reach the level of proper maturity. 
4. The “Living” Sciences 
The issue of reflexivity is more obvious within the life sciences. The self-sustained fundamental character of 
autopoiesis for living systems (Maturana & Varela, 1980) is the ecosystemic expression of a self-reflexive relation.  
In neuroscience, the reflexivity of knowledge is revealed in the fundamental question of brain-in-a-vat problem 
(Putnam, 1981, p. 1-21). How could the theory of neuropsychology of perception be founded, if the law of specific 
nerve energies (proposed for the first time by Johannes Peter Müller in 1835) secluded the physical brain into the 
neurological world? A psychological experience corresponding to the physiological one is no less than an autistic 
world. If brain is a physical object and our sensorial experience is the result of interconnections and firing generated 
by billions and billions of neurons, how could the exteriority be resolute? If both physiological body processes and 
environmental effects are included within the single virtual reality model of psychological reality, the theory of 
external world perception collapses in self-contradiction (Gamez, 2007). If the problem is considered in these terms 
the situation looks inescapable.  
One solution could be the recognition of consciousness as a distinct reality (the second world in Poppers’ 
ontology) (Popper, 1978; Eccles, 1973). The self-reference and self-reflexivity are not identical. The dialectical 
interplay between token, reference, self-reference alongside the inside-outside problem rise the necessity of a 
different understanding of consciousness, before a consistent theory in neurosciences could be constructed. 
„Reflexive self-knowledge is a basic phenomenon, not understandable in terms of anything else which constitutes or 
gives rise to it. While some things might parallel it, for example, linguistic reflexive self-reference, they do so only 
because reflexive self-knowledge underlies these other linguistic phenomena. The linguistic phenomenon then 
would be the reflection of reflexive self-awareness rather than its explanation.” (Nozick, 1981, p. 82) 
The inevitability of reflexivity involvement within the theory was already recognized in neurosciences and the 
first steps were already taken. Critical Neuroscience is a “a reflexive scientific practice that responds to the social 
and cultural challenges posed both to the field of science and to society in general by recent advances in the 
behavioral and brain sciences” (Cloudhury et. al., 2009) It is not too much, but definitely a necessary start.   
The situation is more prominent different in psychology. Here, “reflexivity is blamed for complicating all three 
scientific tasks: explanation, prediction and control: (…) with respect to explanation, there is the problem of 
objectivity (…) with respect to the problem of prediction there is the problem of self-fulfilling prophesy (…) with 
respect to the issue of control there is the problem of manipulation.” (Flanagan, 1981, p. 375) 
The critical role of self-reflexivity in the epistemology of psychology is very well illustrated in Allan R. Buss’s 
thesis on the evolution of psychological theory. In his view psychology seems to be doomed to an eternal flip-flop 
between the supremacy of the behavioral and the supremacy of the cognitive. In psychology the object of study is 
the reflective/reflexive person, and the observer is the reflective/reflexive researcher. The reflection turns upon itself 
in self-reflection, which, in its turn, reflects on its object. Hence, the revolution paradigm is the alternative switch 
between the primacy of subject over the primacy of the object. Due to the self-reflexive relation which exists 
between the psychic and its environment, the excess, or the exclusivity of explanatory power assigned to any of 
those terms, makes corresponding theory to become inconsistent and hence explanatorily collapsing. “Not 
indigenous to the natural sciences, but very much intrinsic and unique to psychology” (Buss, 1978) this forward roll 
between person-constructs-reality and reality-constructs-person in psychology is impossible to be solved within the 
boundaries of any secluded psychological theory. The reflexive cogeneric relation between the psychic and 
environment necessitates, for the consistence and sustainability of explicatory power of psychological theory, the 
inclusion of a transdisciplinary hypothesis. This could be that “the psychological theory is just a form of social 
commentary with both descriptive and prescriptive side” and “the flip-flopping occurs because the social and 
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historical sense we have of ourselves flips-flops.” (Flanagan, 1981) However, the nonlinear models (Riegel, 1976; 
Lerner, 1978) proposed until now seem to be too advanced for the present level of “common sense of scientific 
understanding” (This claim is made from the perspective of sociology of scientific knowledge where the cultural 
background of individual researchers is considered a determining factor of their scientific understanding abilities). 
And it will remain so as long as natural sciences would be taken as model for the social and human sciences.  
Another illustration of the advancement of reflexivity within the life sciences could also be noticed in the 
particular case of geography. In the reflection on the problem of violence, the human geography was infused by 
many different perspectives – Marxist, anarchist, feminist, political or critical – and it came to tackle the very issue 
of the proper name for its inquiry. Proving a high level of self-reflexivity in contemporary geography is thought that 
“horrorism – as though ideally all the innocent victims, instead of their killers, ought to determine the name.” 
(Cavarero, 2009, p. 3) 
5. The Anthropic reflex of Social 
If in natural and life sciences reflexivity is a new strong candidate as a fundamental explanatory factor, in the 
epistemology of social sciences, reflexivity is already a very prolific concept and an adjusting criterion for the 
validity and legitimization of any theory. In social sciences, reflexivity is already normalized and tends to became 
“an ordinary, unremarkable and unavoidable feature of action.” (Lynch, 2000) In this field the tendency toward self-
reflectiveness was facilitated by the need of self-justification and development of self-identity as we find in cases of 
ethnic or sexual minorities or feminism, but also in racisms or nationalism.   
The science of human society already has evolved from its primitive epistemic stance where the standardization 
of methods and formalism were considered to secure the objectivity of the results. The social structures and relations 
could not be objectively measured as long as we fail to ensure the objectivity of the gauge device. However the most 
important measuring device is not the itemized and pretested standardized inventory but the consciousness which 
establishes the meaning and interpretation. The anthropological hybridizations of sociology questioned and 
discarded the traditional illusory foundation of objectivity exclusively on the standardization of the assessment 
device and practice. The social knowledge ceased to be considered a reflection of the essential characteristics and 
relations of social objects within the theory, because such pure reflection is impossible. The core difference between 
modern critical theory and qualitative research orientation, on the one hand, and traditional sociology, on the other, 
lies in the reflexivity of social inquiry. The universal ideal of offering a “‘view from nowhere’ in social science was 
replaced by „reflexive turn” as in the case of critical theory and standpoint theory. 
In critical theory, as defined by Max Horkheimer, the reflexivity could be noticed at both individual and 
theoretical levels. “The world and subjectivity in all its forms have developed with the life processes of society.” 
(Horkheimer, 1982, p. 245)  On the one hand, “the social researchers are themselves engage in socially situated form 
of social action”. But, the on the other hand, promoting a positivist image after the model of natural sciences, the 
social sciences involuntarily demand the same privileged position of a perspective from nowhere as natural sciences 
do. Hence, “one of the first task of critical theory is to challenge the privileged «nonposition» of social-scientific 
knowledge by analyzing the modes of its production, the role it plays in society, the interests it serves, and the 
historical processes through which it came to power.” (Mccarthy, p. 135-136) 
In social sciences, self-reflexivity should account for both aspects: the producer(s) and the product(s) of 
knowledge, the situation of individual researcher and his/her relation with collective theory. If we limit the meaning 
at just one of its senses – the author quality or the object (society) quality–, the theory conception will inevitably 
become inconsistent or self-collapsing. Here, reflexivity is more than benign introspection that is right above the 
level of reflection on the act of research. It is also more than post-hoc reflexivity which represents a commitment to 
reflexivity at the level of content rather than method, and thus affecting this prior commitment and constitutive 
reflexivity (Woolgar, 1988). The (self)reflexivity is an ongoing process which acts simultaneously at both individual 
and social level.  
Moreover, the self-reflexivity is not just a self-referential process, it is a self-transforming one. In the social 
sciences, as in psychology, the reflexivity is reinforced by the similarity between the subject and object of 
knowledge. „To be reflective does not demand «the other», while to be reflexive demands both an other and some 
self-consciousness awareness of the process of self-scrutiny.” (Chiseri-Strater, 1996) And this leads to a process of 
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self-change because the self-knowledge reflection from the social knowledge becomes part and reshapes one’s own 
understanding of world (Weltanschauung). The theory explains the world and thus it makes the world, but this entire 
process of collective knowledge is developed be means of individuals’ knowledge processes and hence the 
hermeneutic circle is auto-poietic.  
On the other hand, a theory could be considered reflexive only if it “can grasp potentials for transformation using 
the same categories and forms of analysis they also use to analyse the reproduction of social life in its current 
sense.” (Pepperell, 2010, note 1, p. 12) A theory becomes self-reflexive when it includes the author and its own 
possibility to think and produce that theory, and, hence, it can sustain the potential of self-evolution and become 
self-sustaining. This is the main reason why a theory large enough to be applied to the very the person who is 
developing it is not necessarily self-collapsing. The alleged hermeneutic circle of self-reference inconsistency is 
dispersed within this self-transforming spiral of self-reflexivity, as is the case of Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit 
(1807) (see also Kojève, 1980).  
It seems that in the sociology of scientific knowledge practice this level of self-reflexivity has been reached. “If 
we successfully shown that studies in natural science are socially constructed, shouldn’t we be exploring the 
«socially constructed» nature of our own (sociological) studies of these studies of sciences?” (Doran, 1989) This 
collective level of scientific self-reflexivity recalls the same dialectical structure of the constitutive process of 
consciousness. It is produced by an on-going process of self-poietic reflexivity.   
As an illustration from other discipline in the field, in economy can we find the most concrete outcome of 
reflexivity, as it has been proved by the George Soros’s financial career. He considered his financial success as the 
result of appliance of the reflexivity insights into stock and currency market behavior (Soros, 1987/2003). 
6. Philosophy of Self-Reflexivity 
In philosophy the reflexivity and self-reflexivity were recognized and practiced from the beginning and embraced 
all possible shapes within various theories.  It was the triggering factor of Descartes’ Meditations, the metaphysical 
substance of Fichte’s idealism, forms Hegel’s absolute methodology, the main source of Wittgenstein’s linguistic 
turn and the ground of Husserl’s phenomenology.  
Within the absolute subjective idealism, self-reflexivity is conceived as the primary substantial activity of the 
entire and only (existing) Reality. Self-reflexivity is the original act of self-poiesis and it comes into existence by 
virtue of its own activity.  “The self's own positing of itself is thus its own pure activity. The self posits itself, and by 
virtue of this mere self-assertion it exists; and conversely, the self exists and posits its own existence by virtue of 
merely existing. It is at once the agent and the product of action; the active, and what the activity brings about; 
action and deed are one and the same.” (Fichte, 1868/1970, p. 97) 
In Hegel’s Absolute Idealism self-reflexivity is relieved in the form of self-fulfilling prophecy. Self-reflexivity 
becomes the paradigm for the method, process and final outcome of the necessary path of evolution of Universe: 
“The beginning and the end, the one who is, who always was, and who is still to come,” as collective consciousness 
(Bloom, 2001). 
It could be said that Hegel conception has announced already a solution for the consistency and theoretical 
problems of modern Physics. The significance of quantum epistemology is not limited to substantiate the 
hierarchical linear evolution of matter-living-social-consciousness, but it asserts subjectivity as the supreme form of 
matter organization, i.e. objectivity. The subjectivity is posited moreover as constitutive factor for objectivity. The 
human consciousness is not only the final end of the evolution of Universe, but its condition of possibility. This is 
the same conclusion that quantum physics supports today. Consciousness is among the primary conditions of 
possibilities of physical objects. Objective knowledge ceases to be an adequacy rei et intellectus and become a co-
creation intellectus et rei. The theory is no longer a reflection of essential proprieties of the object of knowledge, but 
recognition of consciousness within the world of known objects. And by this doesn’t mean that reality reflects the 
subjectivity of consciousness, rather objectivity is grounded in the self-reflexivity of consciousness.   
Every form of idealism since Plato to Pearson militated for the recognition of reflexivity as the cornerstone of 
objective knowledge. Starting with Descartes, the objectivity is based upon the method of rightful, unbiased 
depiction of the experience. But once it is accepted that consciousness experience is an unbypassing condition of 
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understanding – any scientific experience is an experience of a consciousness –, Husserl’s program of 
phenomenology as rigorous sciences became the true positivism perspective. “If «positivism» is tantamount to an 
absolutely unprejudiced grounding of all sciences on the «positive,» that is to say, on what can be seized upon 
originaliter, then we are the genuine positivist.” (Husserl, 1982, I: 39) The experience of consciousness includes not 
only the material world but also the abstract knowledge world. In this condition “science is in reality a classification 
and analysis of the contents of the mind (…) In truth, the field of science is much more consciousness than an 
external world.” (Pearson, 1892/2007, p. 52) 
At this point the euro-Atlantic philosophy and science proves their genetic identity as opposed to Buddhist 
experiential approach of consciousness. The final aim is the study and understanding of consciousness in a rigorous 
manner: science of phenomenology. The consciousness should be experimented in its conceptual, categorical form, 
and not revealed gradually in rigorous practice.  
I can’t end this brief review of the forms of (self)reflexivity in theories from major fields of knowledge, without 
saying anything about its expression in literary works and theory.  In literary works and films the theory of 
reflexivity or self-reflexivity is a “wide and well-tilled field.” (Huber et. al., 2005; Stam, 1992) It might be 
considered that self-reflexivity was practiced more widely and insistently in literature and films than in any other 
field, including philosophy and social sciences. In everyday life the impact of this major aspect of self-reflexivity as 
vital component for any mature knowledge from humanistic works and films was discredited by the dominating 
model of objectivity  from natural science.  
The reflexivity in artistic writing and playing, the “conscious or covert metadrama” was noticed in many forms: 
as play within the play, the ceremony within the play, role playing within the role, literary and real-life reference and 
self-reference (Hornby, 1986). In literary field self-reflexivity is recognized as a rigorous and well-established 
practice which is taught at courses and trainings (Hunt & Sampson, 2006).  
7. Self-Reflexivity Reloaded 
No research and nor any science could become deeply insightful and have a significant explanatory power 
without reaching the level of self-reflexivity. The modern sciences, literary overpass the prejudice of positivist 
theory and advance at the same point of questioning: the requirement of self-reflexivity within the theory. The act of 
research is made by consciousness and consciousness should discover inevitable traces in the inquiry, otherwise the 
research’s rigorousness is doubtful. Any science wide-ranging enough to reflect towards itself should begin with its 
very condition of possibility, i.e. the conscious experience. But any other scientific inquiry should fulfill the minimal 
condition to include reflections on its possible reflexive outcome of its theories, methods, and practices. 
The self-reflexivity is an advance state and method essential for the further sustainable evolution of both society 
and individual. “The key reason for seeking a reflexive theory is not because it can boost our epistemological rigour, 
but because it can help highlight practical potentials for transformation.” (Pepperell, 2010, note 11, p. 12) The self-
reflexivity in science is a condition of sustainable social development much more secured from the dreadful 
consequences as environmental destruction or social crisis. For individuals it can boost toward the stance of 
reflexive Self-Consciousness “Is a state of transcendent (transcendental I would say) self-awareness which confers 
upon the beings who attain it certain powers of adequate response and capacity of stimulus assimilation.” (Halliday, 
1989, p. 1) This presupposed state, equivalent with higher level of Buddhist mental stances, should be the standard 
of the high civilization and complex cultural high-technological society of tomorrow. If this rise of self-reflexivity in 
contemporary Science and Culture is a sign of  self-fulfilling prophecy of Teilhard de Chardin’s Noosphere, Hegel 
Absolute Spirit, or the coming the formations of Global Superorganism (Heylighen, 2007),  global brain (Bloom, 
2001) or collective intelligence, or is just a accident is less important. Anyway, a collective intelligence is very 
improbable to be built in the absence of self-reflexive agents, only by interconnection of intelligent living and 
artificial agents “The basis and goal of collective intelligence is mutual recognition and enrichment of individuals 
rather than the cult of fetishized or hypostatized communities.” (Lévy, 1994, p. 13) Therefore, the nurture and 
practicing of self-reflexivity should be a major obligation for the parents, educators, politicians, researchers and each 
of us. The level of complexity of our world requires mindful researchers, not specialists. Practices and methods as 
Mindful Inquiry (Bentz & Shapiro, 1998) “are ideal for developing self-reflexive intercultural researchers who are 
able to see and to give voice to themselves as intellectuals who are functioning in a particular context while carrying 
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specific biases and identifications,” (Nagata, 2006) in all domains. This kind of training education for a 
comprehensive understanding of the world and oneself should be developed at an early age and widespread in all 
social areas. Any professional is also a member of society and is entitled to act and must behave according with such 
self-reflexive perspective over World. And we do so. 
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